“But ordinary language is all right.”
— Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1930s-1951, The Blue Book
Explore our curated collection of the most famous and impactful Ludwig Wittgenstein quotes.
“But ordinary language is all right.”
“The world and life are one. (5.621)”Original / Translation (German)“Original German: Die Welt und das Leben sind Eins.”English: “The world and life are one. (5.621)”
“I am my world. (The microcosm.) (5.63)”Original / Translation (German)“Original German: Ich bin meine welt (Der Mikrokosmos.)”English: “I am my world. (The microcosm.) (5.63)”
“The world is all that is the case. (1)”Original / Translation (German)“Original German: Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist.”English: “The world is all that is the case. (1)”
“We must plow through the whole of language.”
“612. At the end of reasons comes persuasion.”
“For a truly religious man nothing is tragic.”
“Every explanation is after all an hypothesis.”
“The thought is the significant proposition. (4)”Original / Translation (German)“Original German: Der Gedanke ist der sinnvolle Satz.”English: “The thought is the significant proposition. (4)”
“It is true: Man is the microcosm:
I am my world.”
“This is not for me, I want an entirely rural spot.”
“An entire mythology is stored within our language.”
“If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.”
“The logical picture of the facts is the thought. (3)”Original / Translation (German)“Original German: Das logische Bild der Tatsachen ist der Gedanke.”English: “The logical picture of the facts is the thought. (3)”
“Philosophieren ist: falsche Argumente zurückweisen.”Original / Translation (German)“Philosophieren ist: falsche Argumente zurückweisen.”English: “Philosophizing is: rejecting false arguments. The philosopher strives to find the liberating word, that is, the word that finally permits us to grasp what up to now has intangibly weighed down upon our consciousness.”
“What cannot be imagined cannot even be talked about.”
“The human body is the best picture of the human soul.”
“The world is the totality of facts, not things. (1.1)”Original / Translation (German)“Original German: Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge”English: “The world is the totality of facts, not things. (1.1)”
“I must plunge into the water of doubt again and again.”
“378. Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement.”
“It is clear that the causal nexus is not a nexus at all.”
“So we do sometimes think because it has been found to pay.”
“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. (5.6)”Original / Translation (German)“Original German: Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt.”English: “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. (5.6)”
“The difficulty in philosophy is to say no more than we know.”
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“In philosophy the race is to the one who can run slowest—the one who crosses the finish line last.”
“Philosophy hasn’t made any progress?—If someone scratches where it itches, do we have to see progress? Is it not genuine scratching otherwise, or genuine itching?”
“The real discovery is the one which enables me to stop doing philosophy when I want to. The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself into question.”
“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language.”
“Certainly it is correct to say: Conscience is the voice of God.”
“What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world exists.”
“There is really only one world soul [Weltseele], which I for preference call my soul and as which alone I conceive what I call the souls of others.”
“There is therefore really a sense in which in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I. The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the "world is my world". The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit—not a part of the world.”
“The argument “I may be dreaming” is senseless for this reason: if I am dreaming, this remark is being dreamed as well—and indeed it is also being dreamed that these words have any meaning.”
“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)”
Discover personal opinions Ludwig Wittgenstein shared regarding contemporaries.
“Wisdom is something I would never expect from Freud. Cleverness, certainly; but not wisdom.”
“Freud … has not given an explanation of the ancient myth. What he has done is to propound a new myth.”
“Freud is constantly claiming to be scientific. But what he gives is speculation — something prior even to the formation of an hypothesis.”
“Frazer's account of the magical and religious views of mankind is unsatisfactory; it makes these views look like errors.”
“Frazer is much more savage than most of his savages, for they are not as far removed from the understanding of spiritual matter as a twentieth-century Englishman. His explanations of primitive practices are much cruder than the meaning of these practices themselves.”
“Kierkegaard was by far the most profound thinker of the last century. Kierkegaard was a saint.”
“What Mach calls a thought experiment is of course not an experiment at all. At bottom it is a grammatical investigation.”
“Russell's books should be bound in two colours, those dealing with mathematical logic in red – and all students of philosophy should read them; those dealing with ethics and politics in blue – and no one should be allowed to read them.”
Gain deeper perspective through quotes about Ludwig Wittgenstein from others.
“Whereas Wittgenstein had imagined an indefinite multiplicity of language-games, incommensurable with each other, so paving the way for the particularist doctrine that the signification of sentences could only lie in their heterogeneous usages, Frege understood that language is by its nature a system, competence in which presupposes a tacit grasp of certain general principles that are never reducible to a mere tally of local utterances. At the same time, Frege's philosophy, for all its emphasis on meaning, was not only systematic, but critical. For it retained a stringent concern with truth, where the laxity of Wittgenstein's eventual pragmatics—his notion that all language-games can find their warrant in culturally variable ‘forms of life’, as apprehended by Spengler—was inevitably to afford a franchise for intellectual relativism. Initially close to Wittgenstein's legacy, Dummett came through his prolonged work on Frege to a reaffirmation of the central importance of the assertoric dimension of language—the specificity and necessity of its claims to accurate report of the world—as against the performative functions so favoured by Austin, for whom there could be no critique of current usages. Wittgenstein's basic programme thus had to be rejected: ‘philosophy cannot be content to leave everything as it is,’ for ‘linguistic practice is not immune to, and may well stand in need of, revision.’”
“It was Wittgenstein who evacuated time from language, and thereby converted it into an ahistorical absolute. He was able to do this because he lacked any notion of contradiction. The idea that linguistic change proceeds by an internal dialectic generated by incompatibilities between different rule-systems within it, which give rose to radically new concepts at determinate historical moments, was beyond his horizon. It presupposed an idea of language as neither a monist unity (Tractatus) nor a heteroclite plurality (Investigations), but as a complex totality, necessarily inhabited by different contradictions. It is striking that today, French philosophy is largely concentrated on the problem of the conditions of appearance of new concepts—precisely the problem that English philosophy is designed to avert. The work of Canguilhem and Bachelard is a close study of the historical emergence in the west of the scientific concepts which revolutionized biology and physics. Such an inquiry is a diametric opposite of the whole drift of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and indicates its parochialism. To emphasise the social nature of language, as he did, is not enough: language is a structure with a history, and it has a history because its contradictions and discrepancies themselves are determined by other levels of social practice. The magical harmony of language affirmed by English philosophy was itself merely the transcript of a historically becalmed society.”
“The general method that Wittgenstein does suggest is that of 'shewing that a man has supplied no meaning [or perhaps: "no reference"] for certain signs in his sentences'. I can illustrate the method from Wittgenstein's later way of discussing problems. He once greeted me with the question: 'Why do people say that it was natural to think that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth turned on its axis?' I replied: 'I suppose, because it looked as if the sun went round the earth.' 'Well,' he asked, 'what would it have looked like if it had looked as if the earth turned on its axis?' This question brought it out that I had hitherto given no relevant meaning to 'it looks as if' in 'it looks as if the sun goes round the earth'. My reply was to hold out my hands with the palms upward, and raise them from my knees in a circular sweep, at the same time leaning backwards and assuming a dizzy expression. 'Exactly!' he said. In another case, I might have found that I could not supply any meaning other than that suggested by a naive conception, which could be destroyed by a question. The naive conception is really thoughtlessness, but it may take the power of a Copernicus effectively to call it in question.”
“When I met Wittgenstein, I saw that Schlick's warnings were fully justified. But his behavior was not caused by any arrogance. In general, he was of a sympathetic temperament and very kind; but he was hypersensitive and easily irritated. Whatever he said was always interesting and stimulating and the way in which he expressed it was often fascinating. His point of view and his attitude toward people and problems, even theoretical problems, were much more similar to those of a creative artist than to those of a scientist; one might almost say, similar to those of a religious prophet or a seer. When he started to formulate his view on some specific problem, we often felt the internal struggle that occurred in him at that very moment, a struggle by which he tried to penetrate from darkness to light under an intense and painful strain, which was even visible on his most expressive face. When finally, sometimes after a prolonged arduous effort, his answers came forth, his statement stood before us like a newly created piece of art or a divine revelation. Not that he asserted his views dogmatically ... But the impression he made on us was as if insight came to him as through divine inspiration, so that we could not help feeling that any sober rational comment of analysis of it would be a profanation.”
“Some will say that in the longer run, Wittgenstein's legacy will prove to be the more valuable. Perhaps it will. Wittgenstein, like any other charismatic thinker, continues to attract fanatics who devote their life to disagreeing with one another (and, presumably, with my brief summary) about the ultimate meaning of his words. These disciples cling myopically to their Wittgenstein, not realizing that there are many great Wittgensteins to choose from. My hero is the one who showed us new ways of being suspicious of our own convictions when confronting the mysteries of the mind. The fact remains that one's first exposure to either the Tractatus or Philosophical Investigations is a liberating and exhilarating experience. Here is a model of thinking so intense, so pure, so self-critical that even its mistakes are gifts.”
“Finally, toward the end of my time in Cambridge, I ventured to speak to him. I told him I had enjoyed reading the Tractatus, and I asked him whether he still held the same views that he had expressed twenty-eight years earlier. He remained silent for a long time and then said, “Which newspaper do you represent?” I told him I was a student and not a journalist, but he never answered my question. Wittgenstein's response to me was humiliating, and his response to female students who tried to attend his lectures was even worse. If a woman appeared in the audience, he would remain standing silent until she left the room. I decided that he was a charlatan using outrageous behavior to attract attention. I hated him for his rudeness. Fifty years later, walking through a churchyard on the outskirts of Cambridge on a sunny morning in winter, I came by chance upon his tombstone, a massive block of stone lightly covered with fresh snow. On the stone was written the single word, “WITTGENSTEIN.” To my surprise, I found that the old hatred was gone, replaced by a deeper understanding. He was at peace, and I was at peace too, in the white silence. He was no longer an ill-tempered charlatan. He was a tortured soul, the last survivor of a family with a tragic history, living a lonely life among strangers, trying until the end to express the inexpressible.”
Quotes attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein that are questionable.
“I can well understand why children love sand.”
“The sole remaining task for philosophy is the analysis of language.”
Quotes mistakenly credited to Ludwig Wittgenstein.