Michael Beschloss on Lyndon B. Johnson

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β€œThis year, while House Speaker Paul D. Ryan helped to shape the Trump proposal, the president did not show deep knowledge of the bill and relied largely on congressional Republicans to manage its progress. By contrast, Mr. Johnson mastered the details of his own legislation, and through inspiration, arm twisting and other maneuvering, pushed it through the House and Senate despite powerful opponents like the American Medical Association. Whereas Mr. Trump tried to ram his bill quickly through the House, Mr. Johnson patiently orchestrated a six-month effort to circumvent the reefs and shoals of the legislative process. And unlike Mr. Trump, Mr. Johnson would never have dreamed of sending a White House aide to harangue his party caucus to support his bill. Mr. Trump did little to suggest that he had an emotional commitment to transform health care in the United States. Mr. Johnson’s passion came naturally. He had suffered a near-fatal heart attack in 1955, and his life was saved by the excellent doctors at Bethesda Naval Hospital. He was keenly aware that had he not been a United States senator or otherwise well-to-do, he might well have died at age 46. By fighting for Medicare, Mr. Johnson was building on the efforts of earlier presidents of his own party. Harry S. Truman and John F. Kennedy had both tried to persuade Congress to approve government-backed health insurance.”
β€œIn pushing his health care bill, Mr. Trump had the superficial advantage of controlling both houses of Congress. But he lost the popular vote in the 2016 election and his electoral-college plurality was more modest than many of those won by earlier presidents. By contrast, Mr. Johnson was elected in 1964 with a 61.1 percent landslide, which he cited as a mandate to make fundamental changes under the umbrella of his Great Society programs. And in early 1965, Democrats commanded the Senate by an overwhelming 64 to 34 (there were two vacancies) and the House by 258 to 176 (with one vacancy).”
β€œWe know that Mr. Trump dismissed the counsel of some advisers not to risk his entire legislative program by asking Congress for a controversial bill so early. Mr. Johnson was advised to sequence his demands for federal aid to education, his War on Poverty and other issues so that the House and Senate would not be bombarded by them all at once. But Mr. Johnson insisted on striking on all of them while the iron was hot. He warned aides that despite his electoral landslide and congressional majorities, lawmakers would soon resent him for compelling them to cast votes that might infuriate the voters back home. He predicted that by the time they came back from their August recess, they would be in a rebellious mood. Unlike Mr. Trump, Mr. Johnson knew many of the members well, and understood instinctively, without coaching, how to appeal, behind closed doors, to both their aspirations and their fears in order to persuade them not to obstruct his Medicare plan, phoning them in their beds long before dawn.”