I made the decision myself to contact the Soviets. We told them that we were aware of the problem, asked them for any information about the satellite, and told them unofficially that we would not try to capitalize on their misfortune in a propaganda way. We wanted to be sure that the adequate preparation was made for the reentry of the satellite into the atmosphere, and we notified some of our key allies around the world who would have the capability both to monitor the progress of the satellite and also to deal with radioactivity once it fell. I had a difficult decision to make in how much publicity to bring to this satellite, because it's almost impossible to let people know the facts without the threat being exaggerated, and we didn't want to create exaggerated fears. We monitored the satellite constantly. We shared with the Soviets estimates of when it would come down. the exact point of its penetration of the atmosphere was not known until just an hour or two before it crashed, because it was tumbling. And when a satellite of that kind enters the atmosphere, it can skip off and go several thousands of miles further than you have actually anticipated. We knew that it would fall somewhere between just north of Hawaii, northeast of Hawaii, or the eastern side of Africa. And it was making a great circle route up above the point where it finally fell. That was just about the northern point. The Soviets did tell us, in general, what kind of reactor it was. They told us that their best estimate was it would burn as it entered the atmosphere. So, I can't—without going back and checking the exact language of their report to us—I can't say whether they gave us all the facts. But I think it was handled properly; certainly, by us. I don't know who else the Soviets notified. When I found that it was going to hit Canada, early that morning—I come over here quite early in the morning—I called the Prime Minister of Canada and talked to him on the phone. And we were pretty lucky in telling him where it was going into the atmosphere. We had it on radar. But in retrospect, it may be that the Soviets could have given us more information. I think they probably gave us about what we would have given them in a similar circumstance.

What It Means

This is a placeholder explanation generated by the low-overhead model. It interprets "I made the decision myself to contact the Soviets. We told them that we were aware of the problem, asked them for any information about the satellite, and told them unofficially that we would not try to capitalize on their misfortune in a propaganda way. We wanted to be sure that the adequate preparation was made for the reentry of the satellite into the atmosphere, and we notified some of our key allies around the world who would have the capability both to monitor the progress of the satellite and also to deal with radioactivity once it fell. I had a difficult decision to make in how much publicity to bring to this satellite, because it's almost impossible to let people know the facts without the threat being exaggerated, and we didn't want to create exaggerated fears. We monitored the satellite constantly. We shared with the Soviets estimates of when it would come down. the exact point of its penetration of the atmosphere was not known until just an hour or two before it crashed, because it was tumbling. And when a satellite of that kind enters the atmosphere, it can skip off and go several thousands of miles further than you have actually anticipated. We knew that it would fall somewhere between just north of Hawaii, northeast of Hawaii, or the eastern side of Africa. And it was making a great circle route up above the point where it finally fell. That was just about the northern point. The Soviets did tell us, in general, what kind of reactor it was. They told us that their best estimate was it would burn as it entered the atmosphere. So, I can't—without going back and checking the exact language of their report to us—I can't say whether they gave us all the facts. But I think it was handled properly; certainly, by us. I don't know who else the Soviets notified. When I found that it was going to hit Canada, early that morning—I come over here quite early in the morning—I called the Prime Minister of Canada and talked to him on the phone. And we were pretty lucky in telling him where it was going into the atmosphere. We had it on radar. But in retrospect, it may be that the Soviets could have given us more information. I think they probably gave us about what we would have given them in a similar circumstance." in the context of "" to mean that wisdom is timeless.