Chester Wilmot on Bernard Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein

“It is not surprising, however, that American generals found the British system irksome, especially as applied by Montgomery. To them his methods were the more objectionable because he was so clearly born to command and, even in his most tactful moments, he exercised his authority almost as a matter of right. Moreover, he was not as other men. He shunned the company of women; he did not smoke or drink or play poker with 'the boys.' He could never be 'slapped on the back.' Because he lived in a small tactical H.Q. with a few aides and liaison officers, he was looked upon as setting himself apart from (and therefore above) his fellow soldiers. This impression seemed to be confirmed by his practice, resented as much by other British services as it was by the Americans, of sending his Chief of Staff, de Guingand, to represent him at conferences.”

“Unquestionably there was a marked element of professional vanity in Montgomery's make-up. He was not a man of snap judgments, but once he had made up his mind, he gave the impression of supreme confidence in the righteousness of his decision, and was frequently dogmatic in expounding his views because he had no time for cant, humbug or pomposity. The appearance of conceit was emphasized by his disregard for social graces when he was preoccupied with operations, but he was not so austere, aloof and unfriendly as many Americans thought. He was on closer and easier terms with his own troops than was any other British commander of his day, and he received unbounded loyalty from them. He was most approachable and informal with those who had operational reasons for seeing him and he freely sought advice in private discussion, but as he once said to de Guingand, "You can't run a military operation with a committee of staff officers in command. It will be nonsense!"”

“When Montgomery held a conference of his senior commanders and advisers, it was to 'tell them the form' or to give out orders; not to collect ideas. In expounding a plan at this level, the clarity, the directness and simplicity of his presentation was most convincing, but on other occasions he frequently gave the impression that he was 'talking down' to his audience This was the result of his habit of presenting every problem in the simplest terms with the deliberate intention of inspiring confidence in his solution by making it easier to accomplish. De Guingand writes: "When tackling a problem... [Montgomery] cuts away all the frills and gets down to those factors that really matter. He simplifies everything to an extent I have not met elsewhere. Some say he over-simplifies- to some extent this is true, but the resultant dividend is enormous." Within the British Army this was certainly the case, but to many Americans who had come into direct personal contact with him all this simplification seemed to be so much condescension.”

“The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining the Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. Eisenhower's first reaction was that, even if it was militarily desirable (which he did admit), it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry. "The American public," said Eisenhower, "would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war." To which Montgomery replied, "Victories win wars. Give people victory and they won't care who won it."”

“Montgomery may have been right so far as the British public were concerned, but Eisenhower knew that his troops in the field and his people at home would see the issue in simple terms, almost in terms of American football. Patton was 'carrying the ball,' and was making an 'end run' with every American cheering him on. As Eisenhower saw it, there was no justification- in football or in battle- for taking the ball away from him. Patton had already proved himself to be a master of exploitation and his troops were already across the Seine. Montgomery had no such reputation and his troops had not yet reached the Seine. Neither the British nor the Canadians had yet shown a capacity for advancing with the dash and drive the Americans had demonstrated so brilliantly since the break-out. It is not surprising, therefore, that Eisenhower would have doubted at this stage whether Montgomery had the troops or the commanders to carry the northward thrust through to the Ruhr before the Germans could establish a coherent front.”