Robert Service on Wojciech Jaruzelski

“Jaruzelski himself was reluctant to use any more force than was absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the state order. He had an impossible task. The communist party and the institutions it sponsored – trade unions, youth associations and cultural clubs – attracted popular contempt. The result was chronic stalemate: although Jaruzelski succeeded in restoring a degree of calm, he could not liquidate Solidarity and Solidarity could not supplant his military administration. Poland was like an insect trapped in amber. No fundamental political and economic development was possible for the country. No end to martial law appeared in sight.”

“Brezhnev and the Politburo demanded a change in personnel in the Polish United Workers’ Party and the stabilisation of the communist order. They turned to a military man, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who became Prime Minister in February 1981 and then Party First Secretary in October. Jaruzelski introduced martial law in December 1981. He did this as much to pre-empt a Warsaw Pact invasion as to reimpose order in Poland. In fact the Soviet Politburo had decided not to intervene militarily even if Solidarity were to edge its way to power; but Jaruzelski was not privy to this information. Solidarity was outlawed and more of its militants were taken into custody. Yet the strikes and demonstrations were not abated. The network of Solidarity groups and agencies survived the police onslaught; its presses produced pamphlets, postcards and audiocassettes. Graffiti-artists sprayed slogans on walls such as ‘The winter is yours but the spring will be ours’. The Catholic priesthood gave uncompromising sermons on the need for religious faith and patriotism.”