P. W. Botha Quotes (1916-2006)

“The people who are opposing the policy of apartheid have not the courage of their convictions. They do not marry non-Europeans.”

“I want to warn young people who lend their ears to radicals and who play around with the music from [ANC headquarters in] Lusaka - they will end up inside the bear's fur coat, but they will no longer be able to live.”

“And Afrikaans, this child from the soil of Africa, has already become an instrument for millions of people – yes, for more than just the Afrikaner … God's plan, however, had been the creation of another civilization with a new language from Africa … Afrikaans and this beautiful southern land are undeniably grown together.”

“President P.W. Botha’s notorious “Rubicon” speech on 15 August 1985 at the National Party Congress in Durban was probably one of the most significant speeches in the history of South Africa. It was supposed to break the political and military deadlock between the apartheid government and the banned liberation movements, notably the ANC. Botha was widely expected to announce new policies that could possibly have ended the political conflict in the country. However, that did not happen. Instead the speech was a total fiasco. ...the South African government and P.W. Botha were not ready for such policy breakthrough announcements and had never planned to make them.”

“Uri Friedman: Why did the South African government, in the mid-1970s, decide to embark on a nuclear-weapons program? F.W. de Klerk: The main motivation was the expansionist policies of the U.S.S.R. in southern Africa. They were supporting all the [African] liberation movements—they were supplying weapons and training—and it was part of their vision to gain direct or indirect control over most of the countries in southern Africa. They financed the deployment of many thousands of Cuban troops, especially to Angola, and this was interpreted as a threat first by Prime Minister John Vorster, and following upon him P.W. Botha. [The nuclear arsenal] was never intended, I think, to be used. It was a deterrent. Because of apartheid South Africa was becoming more and more isolated in the eyes of the rest of the world. There wouldn’t be, in the case of Russian aggression or invasion, assistance from the international community. It was felt that, if we have nuclear weapons, and if we then would disclose in a crisis that we have [them], it would change the political scenario and the U.S.A. and other [Western] countries might step in and assist South Africa.”

“[From as early as 1979, P. W. Botha], in his capacity as president of apartheid South Africa, was the real architect of the secret talks that ultimately led to De Klerk’s historic announcement in February 1990. ... Nelson Mandela started the process of persuading [Kobie] Coetsee that the time was ripe for the government to talk to the ANC, and that he was prepared to lead the initiative in prison even before consulting Lusaka. ... Botha’s response was to ... commence secret talks with the ANC to explore possible negotiations with the enemy. ... The South African conflict had reached a stalemate [with] no possibility of victory for either side. ... It was in this toxic environment that Mandela and Botha rose to the occasion, both without a mandate. Mandela defied the ANC and engaged the enemy without a mandate because he knew that the hawks in the ANC would have stopped his initiative. Botha [authorised secret talks] without informing his Cabinet because it was too risky to do so. ... White voters still viewed the ANC as terrorists controlled by Moscow in the context of the Cold War. Reports of Botha talking to the ANC would have sunk him as leader of the National Party and president of South Africa.”