Kenneth Arrow on Milton Friedman

“The concept of freedom, though it appears in the title of the book, is not analyzed. The commonplace idea that poverty is in many ways a restriction of personal freedom is not even mentioned. Implicitly, there are several not completely compatible strands in the Friedmans' analysis. As the title suggests, the Friedmans' advocate an emotional libertarianism. No action is valid which is not the outcome of voluntary action and agreement, the argument made, for example, by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. This position does not rest on economic efficiency at all. Still, the Friedmans' training as economists cannot be shed so easily. Economic progress matters a good deal to them, and economic success is a major argument for laissez-faire. They are also aware that economic theory shows that the market cannot always be successful in achieving efficiency, for there are externalities, such as pollution, with which it does not deal.”

“The question of criteria of judgment assumes particular force when the Friedmans deal with income distribution. They explicitly and strongly repudiate equality of outcome. But their reasoning is less clear. Part of the argument is that fair allocations are hard to define; but the difficulties of defining freedom are not even mentioned, let alone admitted as an argument against some attempt to achieve freedom.”

“The strength of the Friedman's critique of active policy does not lie in general principles or broad sweeps of history. It lies in the itemization of government failures: industrial regulation that is primarily in the interests of the special groups regulated, inefficient post offices, disappointing schools, welfare " messes," the failure of public housing. To some extent the Friedmans document these changes; to a greater extent they rely on current popular perceptions. These failures are in part real, and the Friedmans are not wrong in suggesting that the pursuit of social goals is very apt to be carried on much less efficiently than the pursuit of one's own self-interest. They do not question the theoretical need for internalization of externalities, as in pollution, but argue that the arrangements are bound to be inefficient (actually, they are rather muted on this particular argument, and nowhere flatly assert that the social gains do not exceed the costs). They are strongly opposed to testing drugs for efficacy but do not seem to question testing them for safety. In short, the critique tends to be selective, They are very ingenious at suggesting alternative policies for some problems, such as the voucher system for elementary education, the negative income tax to replace welfare, or the abolition of licensing for physicians. But when advocating comprehensive changes, it is important to consider the effects on the entire system.”

“On one hand, they are opposed to any support of academic research by the government, through the National Science Foundation and similar agencies; on the other hand, their book is replete with praise for the voluntary gift-giving for charities and intellectual life by the rich. I assume, then, that they would have no objection to having research in economics and the social sciences solely supported by gifts from the wealthy. That this state of affairs would result in unbiased research is beyond the scope of belief.”

“I agree with specific planks in the Friedmans' program, but I remain disappointed at the lack of guiding principles, the casual recommendation of sweeping changes without consideration of their systematic effects, and the one-sided selection of evidence and problems.”

“First, I think that his concept of freedom was much too shallow. The idea that low income is a restriction on freedom—something that I think is a fairly elementary point—is something he just never recognized. His idea of somehow equating the market with freedom, well, I don’t think they’re unconnected but to assume it’s a simple matter— as he seemed to assume—is to my mind disregarding the facts of life, and disregarding the values that are put on these ideas. Now Friedman did make some exceptions. He thought extreme poverty was a subject of government policy, but by and large I think this emphasis on freedom is misplaced because it has very little to do with the freedom of the individual, with the individual employee. It was the freedom of the employer, of a minority, that really he was pushing. I think freedom’s important. I certainly wouldn’t say freedom’s an unimportant matter. But the question is: What do you mean by freedom? Expanding the scope by which people can act is an important matter. And it was not just income transfers and other methods. I think Friedman let himself make rather absurd statements, like for example he opposed the licensing of physicians on the grounds that it was a restriction on freedom. So this is an illustration of how his narrow conceptualization of what freedom means led him to kind of absurd statements.”