Allan R. Millett on George Washington

“Having formed an army, Congress selected George Washington to command it. Washington had been with Braddock and Forbes's expedition to Fort Duquesne, and in between service with the regulars he had commanded the Virginia militia. As the crisis with England worsened, Washington played an active rle in Virginia's evolution from resistance to revolution, and he attended both the First and Second Continental Congress. He was the only delegate attending the deliberations in Philadelphia attired in a military uniform, perhaps symbolizing his readiness to fight for American rights. Washington was a reasonably experienced soldier, a form advocate of American liberties, impressive in looks, and articulate without being flamboyant.”

“"I declare with the utmost sincerity," Washington wrote the president of Congress, "I do not think myself equal to the Command I am honoured with." He probably meant it, since his frontier service had given him no opportunity to become acquainted with cavalry tactics, massed artillery, or the deployment of large forces. Yet Washington eventually embodied the Revolution, with the cause and the commander so intertwined in rebel eyes that they became synonymous.”

“During the war with France, Washington had developed an aversion to militiamen and an appreciation for British professionals. He had experienced nothing but problems with the Virginia militia. They never turned out in sufficient numbers, and hose who did he considered insolent and prone to panic and desertion. His opinion did not change during the Revolution, and most Continental officers shared his conviction that "to place any dependence upon Militia is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff." Paradoxically, Washington repeatedly depended on the militia to buttress the Continental Army during innumerable crises. If the militia dismayed Washington, British regulars impressed him, and he strove to mold the Continental Army into a mirror image of Britain's army. He insisted it should be "a respectable Army," not only well organized and disciplined but also officered by "Gentlemen, and Men of Character." He believed that the prospect of such an army endangering civilian supremacy was remote; the slight risk was necessary because the consequence of fighting without a regular army was "certain, and inevitable Ruin."”

“Considering the hypersensative fear of military ascendancy, Congress's selection of Washington was fortuitous. He repeatedly stated his belief in civil supremacy, remaining deferential to Congress even when its inefficiency threatened the army's survival. Having served in the Virginia assembly and in Congress, he understood the often maddeningly slow political process in representative governments and the nation's inadequate administrative machinery for conducting a large-scale war. By reporting to Congress on all matters great or trivial, by religiously adhering to congressional dictates, and through his immense patience in the face of nearly unbearable frustrations, Washington alleviated concern that he would capitalize on his growing military reputation and become a dictator. Although revolutions have frequently given birth to permanent presidents, kings, and emperors, Washington had no desire to become an American Cromwell. Like the men he commanded, he never forgot that he was a citizen first and only second a soldier.”

“The militia and the Continental Army were two sides of a double-edged sword. Neither blade was keenly honed, and even in combination they usually did not make a lethal weapon. Washington's task was never easy, but without either army it would have been impossible.”

“When Washington took command of the Continental Army on July 2, he was eager to pursue an aggressive strategy. But he could do little immediately. A severe shortage of weapons and powder prevented him from attacking the British Army, and his own army appalled him. The New Englanders struck him as "exceedingly dirty and nasty people" characterized by "an unaccountable kind of stupidity" and a lack of discipline. Knowing the eyes of the continent were upon him and expecting some momentous event, Washington found the inactivity around Boston galling, so in late summer 1775 he ordered Arnold to advance through the Maine wilderness to capture Quebec. Unknown to Washington, Congress had meanwhile ordered General Philip Schuyler to attack Montreal. Americans hoped the invasion would incite a Canadian revolt against Britain and convert the region into a fourteenth colony. Washington also struggled to discipline the army, but before he could achieve much success, that army almost disappeared. When enlistments expired at year's end, most men refused to reenlist. Washington had to discharge one army and recruit another while the enemy was only a musket shot away. He did it by calling out militiamen to fill the gaps until new Continental recruits arrived.”